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ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to reconsider the controversial problem of the relationship between the 
philosophy of Hegel and Leibniz. Beyond the thick curtain of historical references (which have been widely 
developed by scholars), it is in fact possible to assume some guideline concepts (i.e. those of ‘singularity’ and 
‘infinity’) to reconstruct the deep theoretical influence which Leibniz played in Hegel’s thought since the Jenaer 
Systementwurf of 1804/05. 
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1. Introduction 
 
  In the following pages I will try to suggest some remarks on the concepts of 
‘singularity’ and ‘infinite’ in Leibniz and Hegel. 
Moving from a brief analysis of the two words, I intend to show how it is possible to 
find a world of semantic connections that bind Hegel and Leibniz together. Choosing to put 
‘singularity’ in relation to the concept of ‘infinite’ was drawn by Hegel’s notation that in 
Leibniz’s ontology singularity “geht in seiner eigenen Totalität zu Grunde.”1 Hegel’s 
somewhat peremptory critique could be seen as a warning that indicates the existence of a 
problem. 
What does Hegel mean when he writes of this Leibnitian bad thematization of 
‘singularity?’ What does this concept refer to? And above all, what is the meaning of 
speaking of a ‘totality’ in reference to a ‘sinking’ singularity? Is it pleonastic or, again, is it a 
warning that needs to be further analyzed? 
                                                          
1 See HEGEL, G.W.F. Jenaer Systementwürf II. In Hegel, G.W.F. Gesammelte Werke. Bd. 7. hrsg. von R.-P. 
Horstmann und J.H. Trede, 1971, p. 144. From now on JS II. 
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From these few and feeble hints, scholars have begun to put the soundness of this 
general hypothesis to the test. From a semantic point of view, this is like saying that, at the 
very heart of Modern thought, the constellations of meanings that gravitate around the words 
‘singularity’ and ‘infinite’ have known shifts, tensions, and also decisive overlapping that 
nowadays we often tend to forget. 
Whilst the concept of ‘infinite’ has been widely recognized to be as one of the most 
pregnant terms of Modernity, that of ‘singularity’ has, on the contrary, often been overlooked 
(unlike other concepts such as ‘individuality’ or ‘identity’ – that are, somehow, related to it). 
This is probably due to the latter’s volatility in comparison to the former and also 
because it has less theoretical appeal. Hegel’s critique of Leibniz’s bad use of ‘singularity’ 
makes us rethink the very foundations of this concept, and thus, rediscover the strong bond 
that the two philosophers had built between ‘singularity’ and ‘infinite’ in their respective 
ontologies. 
Both Leibniz and Hegel, indeed, seem to give a certain polarization  of such concepts. 
One cannot deal with either concept without also referring to the other one. Leibniz first, but 
subsequently Hegel too, believed that a full definition of a singular substance could not be 
successfully determined without taking into consideration the seemingly opposite notions of 
‘totality,’ ‘whole,’ or ‘infinite.’ In the following pages I will try to develop this specific 
hypothesis. 
 
2. ‘World’ and ‘Singularity:’ Hegel as interpreter of Leibniz 
 
First of all we should try to get a clear picture of general references.2 Focusing on the 
project Logik, Metaphisik, Naturphilosophie (Jena 1804/05), let us consider the pages 
                                                          
2 For a general introduction on this topic, see HORN, J. C. Monade und Begriff. Der Weg von Leibniz zu 
Hegel. Wien: Oldenbourg, 1965; BELAVAL, Y. La doctrine de l'essence chez Hegel et chez Leibniz. Archives 
de philosophie, n. 33, 1970, p. 547-578; BELAVAL, Y. Études leibniziennes. De Leibniz à Hegel. Paris: Vrin, 
1976; GUYER, P. Hegel, Leibniz und der Widerspruch im Endlichen. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1978; 
BONSIEPEN, W. Hegels Rezeption der leibnizschen Monadologie. In: Akten des IV Internationalen Leibniz-
Kongress. Hannover, 1983, p. 57-68; INGRAM, D. Hegel on Leibniz and Individuation. Kant-Studien, n. 76, 
1985, p. 420-435; MANNINEN, J. Die leibnizsche Monadologie in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik. In: Akten 
des V Internationalen Leibniz-Kongress, Hannover, 1988, p. 519-524; FALKENBURG, B. Die Wurzeln von 
Hegels Materieauffassung bei Leibniz und Kant. In: Akten des IV Internationalen Leibniz-Kongress. 
Hannover, 1989, p. 71-77; NUNZIANTE, A.-N. Monade e contraddizione. L'interpretazione hegeliana di 
Leibniz. Trento: Verifiche, 2001; KAEHLER, K. E. Hegel und Leibniz. Begreifendes und vorstellendes Denken 
des Absoluten. In: Heidemann, D. H.; Krijnen C. (Eds.). Hegel und die Geschichte der Philosophie. 
Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007, p. 116-130; SANGUINETTI, F. Die Monade als Struktur 
der Objektivität und der natürlichen Welt. Beitrag zur hegelschen Rezeption der leibnizschen monadologischen 
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dedicated to the Monad. As it is known, in JS II we can find the first (and almost complete) 
part of the system that Hegel drew up in Jena. As far as we know, JS II is also the first work 
in which he consciously undertakes a theoretical rethinking of Leibniz’s concept of monad 
and, therefore, is to be considered a fundamental work for our research. 
If in Hegel’s previous works the references to Leibniz could seem scarce (for instance, 
in some of his Stuttgart notes), perhaps only due to the importance of Leibniz’s philosophy in 
the German philosophical culture at the end of the 18th century (think of the hints in the 
Dissertatio philosophica de orbis planetarum, or the use of a Leibnitian argument in the 
polemic against Schulze), in JS II the concept of monad represents a fundamental element in 
the entire section Metaphysik der Objectivität.3 
Having said this, we shall first try to contextualise Hegel’s argumentations. On a broad 
scale we can say that in this phase of his philosophical development, Hegel thought of logic 
as an introductory moment to science. Logic has the task of presenting the relations through 
which the Verstand looks upon its cognitive action, by determining it as its object. This 
specific type of logic progressively falls apart because of the Verstand’s incapability of 
recognizing the mutual ‘interrelationships’ among determinations that are, from time to time, 
by it established. The intellect creates a series of determinations that should be reciprocally 
independent - the reference here is to Kant and, further still, to 17th century logic school 
tradition – nonetheless, the increasing contradictions which arise from these static 
determinations eventually dissolve the work of logic, to the extent that the ‘finiteness’ of the 
intellectualistic way of thinking emerges from its own dissolving.4 
At this point a new ‘metaphysical’ dimension of object emerges, which overcomes the 
nonsense of the previous intellectual distinctions. ‘Subject’ and ‘object,’ ‘spirit’ and ‘world’ 
are interdependent couples of categories and, thus, they are to be understood on a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Philosophie. In: Akten des IX. Internationalen Leibniz-Kongress, Berlin, 2011, p. 973-981; BUÉE, J.-M. 
Hegel et la monadologie leibnizienne. Archives de philosophie, n. 2, 2013, p. 319-333. 
3 For earlier references to Leibniz’s thought see HEGEL, G.W.F. Frühe Exzerpte. In Hegel, G.W.F. 
Gesammelte Werke Bd. III, hrsg. von Friedhelm Nicolin unter Mitwirkung von Gisela Schüler. 1991, p. 115-
119 (Exzerpten nr. 9, 13, 29); HEGEL, G.W.F. Dissertatio philosophica de orbitis planetarum. 
Philosophische Erörterung über die Planetenbahnen, übersetzt, eingel. und kommentiert von W. Neuser, 
Weinheim 1986, p. 5 and p. 41; HEGEL, G.W.F. Verhältnis des Skeptizismus zur Philosophie, Darstellung 
seiner verschiedener Modifikationen, und Vergleichung des neuesten mit dem alten. In Hegel, G.W.F. 
Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 4, hrsg. von Hartmut Buchner und Otto Pöggeler, 1968, p. 65 e p. 117. But see also the 
Nachschrift Troxler edited by K. Düsing in DÜSING, K. Schellings und Hegels erste absolute Metaphysik, 
Köln, 1988, p. 5-23. 
4 See CHIEREGHIN, F. La genesi della logica hegeliana. In: Rossi, P. (Ed.). Hegel. Guida storica e critica. 
Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1992, p. 27-63; here 37-50. 
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metaphysical scale, i.e. assuming that logical determinations and ontological categories 
involve one another. Metaphysics therefore represents a rational mode (Vernunft), that allows 
one to observe the very nature of the relation that runs between ‘knowledge’ and its 
‘contents.’ In other words, the Vernunft stops regarding its known objects as forms of ‘being-
in-itself,’ as something insulated from cognitive processes, because it is rather the contrary: 
objects are involved in cognition and determine themselves (and their own intelligibility) 
from within the rational acts. 
Therefore, metaphysics can be seen as the development of an immanent articulation of 
‘knowledge’ that branches into the following three sections: 1) Das Erkennen als System von 
Grundsätzen (i.e., the acknowledgement of the very principles that build a cognitive process); 
2) the Metaphysik der Objectivität  (i.e., the relationship involving knowledge and its 
‘objects’); and 3) the Metaphysik der Subjectivität (i.e., the emergence of Subjectivity as the 
ontological dimension in which the previous oppositions erase each other out). 
It is within the second section that we find a hint to Leibnitian monadological 
principles. Referring to an object as a ‘monad’ Hegel is, in fact, in the condition to overcome 
the still existing division between ‘knowing’ and known ‘object,’ by considering the latter as 
a totality. The Monad represents a world and its identity is defined by the totality of relations 
involved in its individuality; that also means, from Hegel’s point of view, that in a monadic-
object every form of ‘otherness’ is absorbed ab origine in its internal development. Far from 
the Cartesian idea of ‘ob-iectum’ as something distinct and separated from the subject, the 
Monad is seen by Hegel as the expression of a representative activity in which the subjective 
side of knowledge and the objective side of content are mutually involved. By using this 
concept, Hegel can thus offer a broader notion of ‘object’ by including the knowing-subject as 
part of its structure. As a consequence, we have a strong semantic transformation of the 
meaning of the word ‘subject,’ which turns out to be not a specific particularity (a ‘this’- 
individual), but a kind of ontological structure that ultimately unfolds itself as a representation 
of a world and vice-versa. Object and knowing-subject tie their destiny shifting their 
meanings. 
Let us now go deeper into this. The first element of otherness with which knowledge 
relates to within the Metaphysics of Objectivity is the notion of ‘soul.’ In this passage, the 
Seele is thought by Hegel simply as a substantial unity that is opposed to the outer-world. As 
a ‘Reflexion in sich selbst’ the soul, however, is capable of ‘interiorizing’ its relationship with 
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the world. In fact, the soul is nothing else but the very activity of a entering-into-a-relation 
and it is also the result of this being-determined by relationships. Nonetheless, the emerging 
structure of subjectivity cannot be fully unfolded at this stage, because the Seele still remains 
a singularity that lies next to other singularities and, thus, cannot fully assimilate the always 
resurgent otherness. The soul limits itself only to reflect the image of a ‘preconceived’ world, 
which in turn is constituted by the representation of an indefinite multitude of ‘external’ 
connections.5 Mutual connections of particular singularities, which forms a ‘Kette von 
Synthese,’ in which all souls and things are contained, eventually creates a contradiction 
between the modal dimension of how the soul perceives itself and its ontological way of 
being (i.e., its actual identity conceived as the outcome of the whole process). The soul, 
setting aside its indifference to the otherness, discovers itself as a für sichseyende Totalität: a 
fully developed system of reference. A Monad.6 
What emerges here is the pure shape of a self-relation.7 These are the conceptual 
reasons behind Hegel’s rediscovery of Leibniz’s monadological doctrine. The Monad is 
determined as a subjective activity in which, to put it in Leibniz’s terms, the Cartesian 
subject-object distinction is finally overcome. The Monad, in fact, is not a simple 
representation of a world, but ‘it is’ simply a world. Thus, Hegel can write: 
 
Diß Andere ist ebenso ein sich in sich reflectirendes An sich, welches seine 
Bestimmtheit durch ein anderes selbst bestimmt, sie hiemit aufhebt, und ideel stetzt; 
oder eben so eine vorstellende Monade als die Seele. (JS II, p. 144). 
 
Whilst the soul represented a knowing subject in its singular opposition to a foreign 
world, for Hegel (that here begins to twist Leibniz’s doctrine), the concept of Monad allows 
one to think of the world itself as a knowing totality, as if it were at the same time a reflective 
subjective structure: “das in sich reflectirte und sich reflectirende.”8 The perceptive activity of 
Monads represents (sich vorstellt) otherness as a part of its developmental inner contents. This 
self-explaining circle represents the way in which the soul comes to coincide with its own 
complete concept, the collapsing point in which the epistemological point comes to coincide 
with the ontological nature of its individuality. 
                                                          
5 See JS II, p. 142. 
6 Ivi, p. 143. 
7 The Monad is “schlechtin die Beziehung in sich selbst,” and for this it is the pure form of a ‘totality’ (see JS II, 
p. 146) 
8 Ivi, p. 143. 
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This is indeed the impact that Monadic philosophy has had on Hegel’s early thought. 
Nonetheless, Hegel does not stop here and transforms the concept of Monad even further. In 
Leibniz’s system the Monads were infinite, not only numerically, but also qualitatively, 
because each of them was considered to be an expression of a world in its infinite 
individuality. A typically Leibnitian issue consisted indeed in the ‘harmonization’ of infinite 
Monadic worlds (each of them was the bearer of an infinite interiority). As we have seen, 
Hegel interprets the Monad not so much as an individual entity, but rather as the pure form of 
a self-relation. By doing so he combines the epistemological level (the way in which the 
individual-monad acknowledges itself as a world of infinite interrelationships) with an 
ontological issue (what the monadic-individuality actually is), whilst according to Leibniz the 
connection between these two spheres was somehow problematic and not at all self-evident.9 
From Hegel’s point of view, the presence of a multiplicity of different self-reflective 
structures (each maintaining its own singular individuality) is somewhat secondary to the 
problem of the form of the self-relation itself. He detaches, so to say, this logic-ontological 
point from the rest, while in Leibniz’s universe to consider the pure shape of a self-relation, 
independently from the substantial relata, does not make any sense (because of Leibniz’s 
nominalism). 
This is where the two theories are harder to compare. For Leibniz, modal self-relations 
stand for an essential trait that defines a particular class of individuals (i.e., those endowed 
with a ‘mind’) and should be considered as an internal distinction among substances. 
Assuming that every monad entertains a certain relation with its internal states, there are some 
particular monads that manifest the capacity of reflecting on themselves and of recognizing 
their psycho-physiological states as the counterparts of the so-called ‘I-thoughts.’ Such 
particular individuals are called by Leibniz ‘spirits’ and they are thus capable of ‘objectifying’ 
their inner states. Self-relation is therefore not at all an abstract concept, something that can be 
                                                          
9 The definition of individual substances, as known, is a complex element in Leibniz’s thought. The relation that 
binds a ‘monadic individual’ with its ‘complete concept’ is equally a complex thing (more complex than what 
we can make out from Hegel’s interpretation). The notion of ‘complete concept’ implies a whole series of 
problems that we will see further on in the following pages. This is to say that it is not prosaic to define what a 
Monad ‘knows’ of itself and ‘how’ it sees its own representative contents. For further studies on these aspects in 
Leibniz’s thought see MONDADORI, F. Reference, Essentialism and Modality in Leibniz’s Metaphysics. 
Studia Leibnitiana, n. 5, 1973, p. 73-101; MATES, B. The Philosophy of Leibniz. Metaphysics and 
Language. New York/Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1986; ISHIGURO, H. Leibniz’s Philosophy of Logic 
and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990; COVER. J., O’ LEARY-HAWTHORNE, J. 
Substance and Individuation in Leibniz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; DI BELLA, S. The 
Science of the Individual: Leibniz's Ontology of the Individual Substance. Berlin-Dordrecht-Heidelberg-
New York: Springer, 2005. 
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thought of independently from a determined individual mind’s activity, but it is rather bound 
to an ontological (let us say substantial) core.10 
Conversely, in Hegel’s ontology, at least in this Jena project of metaphysics, the self-
relation itself becomes the substantial element of a kind of objective-subjective process. 
Insofar as the self-relation becomes the only means through which it is possible to define the 
real nature of ‘substantiality, the strength of the conceptual displacement which invests the 
very notion of ‘subjectivity’ is also clear. In Hegel’s view, a substance is not an essence to 
which an infinite ensemble of predicates pertains. It is, rather, a general process of conceptual 
definition, in which what is being focused is not a specific individual, but the shape of a 
‘whole.’11 
This way of reading JS II helps us to highlight how, for Hegel, the notion of 
‘singularity’ (Einzelnheit) is the very bone of contention (realism vs. nominalism) and, again, 
how it “geht in seiner eigenen Totalität zu Grunde”, when it is considered as a monadic 
individual.12 The Monad is a simple ‘this’ that is set as an ‘absolute infinity.’ It is an 
individual structure that defines itself as an infinite collection of predicates and it is precisely 
this mutual relation between singularity and infinity that is the crucial point stressed by Hegel. 
According to him, the monad is incapable of mastering the infinite multiplicity of its 
underlying determinations and that’s why the singularity geht zu Grunde. The core of Hegel’s 
arguments can be seen in this ‘bad’ kind of relation that lies between ‘singularity’ and 
‘totality’ (the Monad is an expression of a ‘bad infinity’).13 Thus, Hegel writes: 
 
Die Monaden als existierende Dinge drükken nur ein und ebenddasselbe Allgemeine 
aus, ihre Vielheit so wie die Bestimmtheit ihrer Bewegung ist das schlechtin 
Zufällige und das Existierende, in Beziehung auf die Einzelnheit, in der Tat das nur 
Mögliche. (JS II, p. 148). 
 
In other words, Hegel believes that in Leibniz’s philosophy the categories of 
‘singularity,’ ‘totality,’ ‘infinite,’ ‘being/reality,’ and ‘possibility’ do collapse on one another. 
Each determination is crystallized and therefore Leibniz needs to introduce an extra-systemic 
                                                          
10 See Principes de la philosophie ou Monadologie, in LEIBNIZ, G.W. Principes de la nature et de la grâce 
fondés en raison. Principes de la philosophie ou Monadologie. publiés par A. Robinet, Paris 1954. §§ 29-30. 
11 The Monad as ‘totality’ becomes the ‘universal’ for Hegel, and this becomes “aus dem Definitum zu seiner 
Definition” (see JS II, p. 145). 
12 JS II, p. 144. 
13 Ivi, p. 145. 
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concept, that of ‘pre-established harmony,’ to solve the contradictions that undermine the 
consistence of his ontology.14 
The conclusion emerging from these pages of JS II runs as follows. The way of being of 
each Monad does not coincide with its own concept. Monads are purely existing ‘objects,’ but 
the ontological form of their Existenz doesn’t match the epistemological dimension of their 
self-knowledge. The interwoven totality which substantiates their real structure remains 
always and constantly a step ahead (or behind) their actual ‘individuality.’ Moreover, if this 
very conceptual dimension of ‘individuality’ emerged, then the Monads would drop their 
individual point of view and the single monadic individual would be lost, annihilating its 
individual identity, but at the same time becoming the aufgehobene totality of a more 
complex and resulting process (“das Einzelne ist sich zum ganzen prozess in der Totalität 
geworden”).15 
So much then for JS II then.  
But if we take a look at Hegel’s mature works, we can easily observe that his 
interpretation of the whole matter remains mostly unvaried. Opening the third section of the 
Logik (B. Das Objekt) in the Berlin Encyclopaedia we read in the first Anmerkung:    
  
Die Definition: das Absolute ist das Object, ist am bestimmtesten in der 
Leibnizischen Monaden enthalten, welche ein Objekt aber an sich vorstellend, und 
zwar die Totalität der Weltvorstellung seyn soll. (Enz. C, § 194 Anm.). 
 
Similarly, monadic individuality is taken into account in the first section of the 
Nuremberg Logic, entitled Mechanical Object (in the section dedicated to a concept’s 
‘objectivity’). And the same can be said for the Heidelberg encyclopaedic logic, in which the 
reference to Monad opens the section ‘B’ (‘The Object’), in the third part of the ‘Doctrine of 
the Concept.’16 
Hegel came, thus, to the conclusion that the Monad could be interpreted as a helpful 
tool to understand the very notion of ‘object’ as it was expounded in his mature system. The 
reason for this conviction refers precisely to the absence of permeation subsisting between 
individuality (purely existing being) and totality (self-developed ‘concept’). The Monad is a 
                                                          
14 See HEGEL, G.W.F. Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie. hrsg. von G.J.P.J. Bolland, Leiden 
1908, p. 937. 
15 JS II, p. 147. 
16 See BONSIEPEN. Hegels Rezeption, p. 57-62. 
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‘being’ that does not fully coincide with its ‘concept’ and, thus, it takes the shape of a 
contradiction (“vollständig entwickelte Widerspruch”).17 
 
3. Leibniz’s notion of ‘singularity’ 
 
If we accept what has been said until now, we might attempt a more careful lexical 
analysis. 
If until now ‘singularity’ has been examined as one of the key concepts of Hegel’s 
interpretation of Leibniz, we should nevertheless be reminded that this concept has a 
multiplicity of meanings also in Leibniz’s philosophy. 
In the De mundo praesenti, written between 1684 and 1686, when describing the 
relation between ‘substance’, ‘singularity’ and ‘concept’, Leibniz wrote: 
 
Substantiae autem jam tum concretus est conceptus, nec praedicari potest nisi de 
substantia, et substantia singularis nulli alii rei singulari inest, cum tamen Accidens 
singulare substantiae singulari insit, plura accidentia substantiae uni.18 
 
What does Leibniz intend here? 
First of all he says: “The concrete element of the substance is the concept” (conceptus). 
The latter, in its turn: “cannot be predicated, but of substance.” Moreover, we could say, that 
it is the ‘concept’ that holds and expresses the essential ‘singularity’ of a substance in itself. 
Leibniz establishes a strong logical relation between ‘concept’ and ‘singularity.’ However, 
after that, Leibniz states, apparently in a pleonastic way: “substantia singularis nulli alii rei 
singulari inest.” (AVI 4, B1, p. 1506-1507). 
Meaning: ‘singularity’ is not an attribute that can be shared amongst substances. Every 
substance is expressed by a concept of its own and each ‘singularity’ is irreducible with 
regards to other existing singularities. In nature two entirely overlapping ‘totalities’ cannot be 
given and in the very concept of ‘totality’ lies the internal differentiation among individual 
substances (according to the principle of the identity of indiscernibles). 
                                                          
17 HEGEL, G.W.F. Enzyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830). In Hegel, 
G.W.F. Gesammelte Werke. hrsg. im Auftrag der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft. Bd. 20, hrsg. von W. 
Bonsiepen und H.-C. Lucas, unter Mitarbeit von U. Rameil. Meiner: Hamburg 1992, § 194 Anm. 
18 See De mundo praesenti in LEIBNIZ, G. W. Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe. hrsg. von der Preussischen 
(nunmehr Deutschen). Akademie der Wissenschaften: Darmstadt 1923- (A VI, 4 B, p. 1506-1507). For a 
comment on the thesis developed by Leibniz in the De mundo praesenti, see PARKINSON, G.H.R. The Concept 
of Substance in Leibniz's “De mundo praesenti”. Studia Leibnitiana, 33, 2001, p. 55-67. 
ANTONIO NUNZIANTE                              INFINITE VS. SINGULARITY BETWEEN LEIBNIZ AND HEGEL 
 
Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegelianos ano. 12, N.° 19 (2015) 
 
65 
But there is something more. 
The substance’s singularity is expressed by the very concept that defines it, but at the 
same time the latter represents the collection of those ‘singular accidents’ (predicates) that all 
together define the singularity of the substantial individuality. Therefore, Leibniz sets a tight 
relation of inherence between ‘singular accident’ and ‘singular substance,’ where the former 
cannot be thought, but in relation to a substance, and the latter forms a ‘unity’ only by virtue 
of the totality of its inhering accidents: “cum tamen Accidens singulare substantiae singulari 
insit,plura accidentia substantiae uni.” (ibid.) 
The terms ‘concept,’ ‘substance,’ ‘singular substance,’ ‘singular accident’ are thus mutually 
connected. The ‘concept’ is the concrete element of the substance’s singularity. “Conceptus 
autem completus est nota substantiae singularis.” (ibid.). 
But what is a complete concept for Leibniz? 
         Literally, a complete concept is qui omnia jam virtute continet, quaecunque de ipso 
possunt intelligi: 
 
Et quidem substantiae singularis conceptus est quiddam completum, qui omnia jam 
virtute continet, quaecunque de ipso possunt intelligi. Ita ut Deus eo ipso dum hujus 
Petri substantiam concipit, omnia concipiat quae ei contigere aut contingent. Quod 
de accidente singulari dici non potest, nisi quatenus substantiae singulari inesse 
concipitur. (A VI 4, B,p. 1507). 
 
For instance, when referring to the substance ‘Peter,’ all the determinations that can be 
referred to Peter will be held in its complete concept, including the contingent ones.19 
We must then remember, however, that for Leibniz a singular predicate can be known only 
because it is part of a ‘totality’ that defines it. The element of ‘singularity’ is such, only when 
it inheres to the totality of a sequential collection (when it is part of an infinite set of 
elements). In other words, it can be known – moreover, it can subsist ontologically – only 
when it is embedded within a conceptual element (to this amounts the doctrine of ‘complete 
concepts’).20 
                                                          
19 On the concept of ‘contingent’ and its relation with the complete concept, see ADAMS, R. M. Leibniz: 
Determinist, Theist, Idealist. New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994; COVER, J.; O’ LEARY-
HAWTHORNE, J. Substance and Individuation in Leibniz; MUGNAI, M. Introduzione alla filosofia di 
Leibniz. Torino: Einaudi, 2001; PIRO, F. Spontaneità e ragion sufficiente. Determinismo e filosofia 
dell’azione in Leibniz. Roma: Edizioni di Storia  e Letteratura, 2002, DI BELLA. The Science of the 
Individual. 
20 “Ex Alphonsi regia potestate non concipio ejus Astronomiam, nisi redeam ad ipsius Alphonsi naturam 
singularem. Porro substantia universalis nihil aliud est quam omnis substantia singularis talis. Cum autem 
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This is the reason why Leibniz ends the following passage by stating that the ‘universal 
substance’ is nothing but the very single substance as such. Universality and singularity 
coincide at the height of the complete concept:    
 
Porro substantia universalis nihil aliud est quam omnis substantia singularis talis. 
Cum autem substantia singularis involvat relationes ad totum universum patet eam 
semper esse infinitam. (ibid.) 
 
Insofar the singularity of a substance is nothing but the expression of a totality of 
relations entertained with the world (the latter perceived by its own perspective), then it is 
also ‘universal.’ 
But then again, what is a ‘concept?’ And further still, how does one might one specify 
the relation between ‘singularity’ and ‘totality?’ 
Leibniz seems to be telling us two things at the same time: 
1- the concept is the ‘concrete’ element of the singular substance, in the sense that without the 
reference to a totality-system there cannot be any individual singularity. 
2- the concept is always the expression of an already existing individual substance, in the 
sense that if there were not an ontology of substances to support it, the concept alone would 
not be indicative of anything. The complete concept expresses the singular substance’s 
specific character, because it takes it to a full manifestation, but it doesn’t ‘create’ anything ex 
nihilo.21 
Therefore, this could be seen as a ‘twofold’ reversible relation, from singular to concept, 
from concept to singular. Or rather, from singularity to totality and from totality to 
singularity. Or even, from the universal to the concept and from the concept to the universal. 
But is it possible to develop all this line of argument, without subsequently transforming 
everything into a circular reasoning? 
Following the classical argument set by the Discourse of Metaphysics, the complete 
concept holds in itself the totality of possible predicates that inhere to a substance. Namely, it 
holds in itself the key to a singular individuality. Nonetheless, this can happen only if the 
concept is ‘complete.’ Only when it is capable of fully expressing a ‘totality.’ 
Let us try then to investigate the concepts of ‘totality,’ ‘infinite’ and ‘limit’ to see whether we 
can grasp some helpful pieces of information from this side. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
substantia singularis involvat relationes ad totum universum patet eam semper esse infinitam.” See De mundo 
praesenti, A VI 4, B1, p. 1507. 
21 See the character of the concept of ‘note’ given by Leibniz in A VI 4 A, p. 586-587. 
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3.1. Datis ordinatis etiam quaesita sunt ordinata 
 
When considering Leibniz’s thought about the infinite we must keep in mind that this is, 
first and foremost, a mathematical issue.22 Therefore, at a first glance, the problem of the 
determination of the infinite can be seen as a focusing of key concepts such as ‘continuum,’ 
‘integral,’ ‘momentum,’ ‘evanescent quantities,’ and so on. Let us see how this is done. 
First of all, having set the principle of continuum, Leibniz also admits to the presence of 
some “integral terms” to which “partial terms” can refer to: “Terminum intelligo integralem, 
nam partiales fiunt ex integrali et particula, ut pars est ens in aliquo” (A VI 4, A2, p. 742) 
Thus, for Leibniz, thinking something such as the ‘largest’ or ‘smallest’ of all numbers 
makes little sense. The notion of infinite becomes comprehensible only if it is switched into a 
whole/part relation, that is to say only when considering it in a ‘functional way’ (considering 
the relation subsisting between integral and infinitesimal). In other words, the integral cannot 
be thought of being the result of a quantitative sum of infinitesimal quantities. Rather, it 
should be seen as the generative principle of a functional relation: a relation ‘of order’ that 
stands between integral and infinitesimal. 
In a letter sent to Bayle in 1687, Leibniz defines continuity as follows:      
 
Lorsque la difference de deux cas peut estre diminuée au dessus de toute grandeur 
donnée in datis ou dans ce qui est posé, il faut qu'elle se puisse trouver aussi 
diminuée au dessus de toute grandeur donné in quaesitis ou dans ce qui en resulte, 
ou pour parler plus familierement: lorsque le cas (ou ces qui est donné) s'approchent 
continuellement et se perdent enfin l'un dans l'autre, il faut que les suites ou 
evenemens (ou ce qui est demandé) le fassent aussi. Ce qui depend encor d'un 
principe plus general, sçavoir: Datis ordinata etiam quaesita sunt ordinata.23  
 
Leibniz attributed (as Newton did in those years) a qualitative nature to the 
infinitesimal, and this very same idea will become of paramount importance for Hegel too. 
In a later letter to Varignon, Leibniz fully develops this qualitative assumption, as can 
be seen in the following passage: 
                                                          
22 For a first approach on the issue see: LEVEY, S. Leibniz on Mathematics and the Actually Infinite Division of 
Matter. The Philosophical Review, n. 107, 1998, p. 49-96; BURSCHEID, H-Joachim, STRUVE, H. Die 
Differentialrechnung nack Leibniz – Eine Rekonstruktion. Studia Leibnitiana, n. 33, 2001, p. 163-193; 
PASINI, E. La Philosophie des mathématiques chez Leibniz. Lignes d'investigation. In: Akten des VII 
Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress, Berlin, 2001, p. 954-963. 
23 See LEIBNIZ, G.W. Die philosophischen Schriften. hrsg. von C.I. Gerhardt, Berlin 1875-90. Bd. III, p. 52. 
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il se trouve ques les regles du fini reussissent dans l'infini, comme s'il y avait des 
atomes (c'est a dire des elemens assignables da la nature), quoyqu'il n'y en ait point 
la materie estant actuellement sousdivisée sans fin; et que vice versa les regles de 
l'infini reussissent dans le fini, comme s'il y avait des infiniment petits 
metaphysiques, quoyqu'on n'en ait point besoin; et que la division de la materie ne 
parvienne jamais à les parcelles infiniment petites.24  
 
Again, what we have here is the idea of a corresponding relation between ‘finite’ and 
‘infinite.’ Taking for granted the idea of continuity, infinitesimals must necessarily displace 
themselves according to that functional order intentioned by the whole.  
Let us further consider this fundamental point and let us focus our attention on the third 
and fundamental element of Leibniz’s mathematical thought: the concept of evanescent 
quantity. Until now we have seen how Leibniz establishes an essential relation between 
infinitesimal and integral, meaning that the only way we can relate to the infinitesimals is by 
setting them in some ‘order,’ similar to the whole/part one. From a mathematical point of 
view, if we do not take into account this functional relation, it is impossible to solve the 
problem  of a continuum’s determination. 
A further step must be taken to get a broader glance of the matter. Once the 
functionality of the relation that connects infinitesimal and integral is established, we must 
understand how to concretely develop the qualitative consideration of infinitesimal quantities. 
For this reason Leibniz used the concept of ‘evanescent quantity,’ that at the time was 
commonly used in mathematical culture (also by Newton). 
We can say that in the procedure of infinitesimal calculus the nature of the evanescent is 
considered to be both a null and a not-null quantity. This means that when one adds a 
differential to a finite quantity the result is that very same finite quantity (thus, it acts as a null 
quantity); whilst, if we consider a relation between differentials (dy/dx), the latter can be, for 
example, equal to 2, as if dx and dy would both be different from zero. The infinitesimal is 
therefore not an ‘absolute nothing’ (nihil absolutum), but rather, as Leibniz wrote in a letter to 
the Italian mathematician G. Grandi, a nihil respectivum (‘relative nothing’), thereby 
intending that the variation of quantity functionally depends on the relational context in which 
it operates. 
                                                          
24 See LEIBNIZ, G.W. Leibnizens mathematische Schriften. hrsg. von C.I. Gerhardt, Berlin 1849-63. Bd. IV, 
p. 93-94. 
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This passage is of paramount importance. The evanescent quantity must not be thought 
as a fixed quantum, but rather as a variable that is functionally linked to other variables. What 
are then the criteria of its variability? Leibniz’s answer is that in the infinitesimal procedures 
the given evanescence quantity maintains, when it becomes zero, the ‘character’ of the 
quantity from which it derives. Thus, it can be ‘extensionally’ considered to be zero, but not 
‘intensionally,’ because it keeps a relation with the quantity which was dissolved and from 
which it was derived. This is what Leibniz wrote to Grandi on the matter: 
 
Interea infinite parva concipimus non ut nihila simpliciter et absolute, sed ut nihila 
respectiva (ut ipse bene notas), id est ut evanescentia quidem in nihilum retinentia 
tamen characterem ejus quod evanesci. (GM IV, p. 218).25 
 
When the evanescence is not simply close to zero, but it wholly ‘becomes’ zero we have 
a full resolution of the infinitesimal and, thus, its complete definition in the integral that 
expresses it. Being an evanescere a sort of process (or ‘activity’), it is important to see how 
the characterem of what vanishes is ‘retained’ (retentum), or ‘conserved,’ in its formal 
aspects when it has been entirely vanished (let us be reminded how this form of retention 
influenced Hegel on the concept of Aufhebung). 
To define this particular context, Leibniz uses a term which was specific to his 
philosophical dictionary: that of ‘character.’ The infinitesimal sets down its quantitative 
aspect in to the zero, whilst it still keeps a sort of provenance mark: its ‘character.’  
‘Character’ is a sign, a symbol that expresses something else: it does not have a content in 
itself, but rather refers to a process of definition. Thus, ‘character’ means something 
‘qualitative,’ which is ‘formal’ in Leibniz’s own terms, and represents the outcome of a whole 
process: it is, precisely, the pure form of its representation.26 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 MORETTO, A. Hegel e la matematica dell’infinito. Trento: Verifiche, 1984, p. 287.   
26 See A VI 4 C, p. 2768. On the concept of ‘character’ the references are, obviously, innumerable. I’ll only give 
a couple of them here from the writings of ’77 that seem to me to be fitting. In the first one he states: “Nam etsi 
characteres sint arbitrarii, eorum tamen usus et connexio habet quiddam quod non est arbitrarium, scilicet 
proportionem quandam inter characteres et res; et diversorum characterum easdem res exprimentium relationes 
inter se. Et haec proportio sive relatio est fundamentum veritatis” (Dialogus, A VI 4 A, p. 24). In the second, 
instead it is said that the characters ‘represent things,’ but do not identify themselves with ‘the thing itself’ (La 
vraie methode, A VI 4 A, p. 5). 
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4. Does singularity means infinite? 
  
On the one hand, the importance of the last statement lies in the fact that for a number 
of reasons it shifts the perspectives until now considered under a new logical (and also 
symbolical) dimension. On the other hand, this perspective refers again to the language of 
‘substance,’ thus, to the issue of defining the singularity and its relation to accidental 
predicates. 
Let us then go back to these problems and see if the mathematical considerations we 
have been focusing on can help to shed further light on this issue. 
As we were saying, substance is, in its nature, a ‘totality’ and for this reason it is also 
‘singular’ (remember that, according to Leibniz, two totalities can never overlap). Therefore, 
the predicate of singularity determines the manner of being of a substance in an ‘essential’ 
way. 
Furthermore, a substance is also a collection of singular accidents. Singularity seems to 
express  a kind of double level, because substance can be defined as something singular when 
it is considered as a whole, but at the same time, if we are to consider its inner-composition, 
every substance is somewhat structured by an infinite dimension of ‘singular’ determinations. 
What relation subsists here between these two levels of singularity? This is where 
mathematical notions can be useful.27 
Let us start by looking at the issues drawn in the Generales inquisitiones and let us 
move from there. First of all, Leibniz says that there are some ‘integral terms’ (terminus 
integralis, sive perfectus) to which ‘partial terms’ (partialis, sive imperfectus) refer to. Yet, 
before even reflecting on the relation between ‘integral’ and ‘partial,’ Leibniz focuses on the 
notion of ‘term,’ distinguishing different types of terms: 
 
a) Simple primitive terms (such as ‘A’) - i.e., terms that are irresolvable in others, or 
taken as such. 
b) Complex terms that are composed of two or more simple terms (as ‘AB’). 
c) Simple derived terms that don’t emerge from a simple composition, but by using a 
simple particle – i.e., by using ‘primitive syncategorematic’ ones – as for instance ‘A in B.’ 
d) Complex derived terms that are composed of two or more derived terms. 
                                                          
27 Leibniz himself stresses the importance of having a ‘sprinkling of maths’ to understand the relation between 
the ‘primitive predicates’ to the ‘complete concept’ that binds them. See MUGNAI. Introduzione, p. 198. 
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e) More complex cases that result from the combination of the previous points. 
 
Leibniz imagines a combinatorial pattern structured by different kinds of integrals. 
Some are defined as ‘composed’ or ‘derived,’ to the extent that they can be divided into more 
elementary terms (‘partiales’). Others are ‘simple’ and cannot be divided any further. For this 
reason they are also defined as ‘purely integral terms.’ 
These purely integral terms are thus independent from any other combination of partial 
elements. It is rather the opposite: it is only the presence of some purely integral terms that 
allows the definition of the partial ones - because without the former the latter would prove to 
be pretty insignificant. Leibniz writes as follows: 
  
Sed tamen ante partiales et particulas explicari debent illi integrales qui aut non 
resolvuntur, aut non nisi in integros. Et tales integrales a partialibus indipendentes 
utique esse necesse est, saltem generales, ut Terminus, Ens, nam his ipsi partiales 
indigent, ut transeunt in integrales. (A VI 4 A2, p. 741). 
 
What are these “purely integral terms” Leibniz refers to? Which are those ‘simple 
primitive’ terms, that don’t derive from a further process of combination? The first simple 
integral thought of by Leibniz, the first element in the list, is the notion of ‘term’ itself. 
Putting it in mathematical terms, this is not in any way surprising. The concept of term 
represents a whole that is not itself composed (as a line, according to Leibniz, is not 
composed by a series of points), but it represents a higher-order function 
What are then the other ‘simple primitive’ and purely integral terms? Here they are: 
Ens, Existens, Individuum, Ego.28 
We are now in a position to sum up all of these complex lines of reasoning developed 
by Leibniz. 
We first observed the close relation subsisting between the notions of ‘substance,’ 
‘singularity’ and ‘concept’ and we were reminded, by the quoting of some very clear texts, 
that the complete concept expresses the substance’s essential singularity (conceptus autem 
completus est nota substantiae singularis). 
Therefore, we have seen how both the singular accident and the whole substance could 
be defined only with reference to a ‘totality’, which involves a whole series of determinations. 
                                                          
28 On the notion of ‘Ego’ Leibniz writes: “est aliquid peculiare, et difficulter explicabile in haec notione, ideo 
cum integralis sit, ponendam hic putavi.” A VI 4, A2, p. 744. 
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We then looked upon the relations between ‘singularity’ and ‘totality,’ asking ourselves 
whether Leibniz’s argumentations were not indeed running along the line of a circular 
reasoning. On the same lines, the notion of singularity seemed to hide an ambiguous ‘double 
level’ of meanings, being essential for the definition of substance (‘Socrates’), as well for its 
inner accidents (‘snub nose’).     
We can therefore outline four essential points: 
1) Firstly, the accidents cannot be considered as partial elements of the substance, 
because the latter (being an ‘essence,’ an ‘existing,’ an ‘individual’ or an ‘I’) represents for 
Leibniz a ‘simple primitive,’ i.e. a ‘purely integral.’ That means that substance is not formed 
by ‘summing’ or ‘combining’ its predicates, in the same way as the continuum is not a 
summative of points. 
2) Secondly, the relation between substance and accidents is similar to that between 
integrals and infinitesimals. The complete concept expresses this relation and, therefore, 
should itself be considered as a ‘simple primitive,’ a ‘singular term,’ or an integral.29 
3) Thirdly, the ‘double level’ played by the notion of singularity can be understood by 
taking into account the relations between the whole substance and its accidents, on one side, 
and the intra-predicative relations on the other – and they turn out to be very different. In the 
former case, the substance plays the role of an integral: it is a functional point of reference. In 
the latter, the function changes because it is each accident that from time to time becomes the 
singular term of reference, changing its relation to the other particular predicates. Therefore, it 
is not the definition of ‘singularity’ that changes, but the context in which it displays a 
function. 
4) Lastly, if our assumptions are consistent, one should conclude that the semantic pair 
formed by the notions of ‘singular’ and ‘singularity’ does not refer to the cluster of notions 
defined by the lexicon of being ‘part,’ ‘partial’ or ‘infinitesimal’, but rather to that of ‘whole,’ 
‘totality’ and ‘integral’ terms. In other words, singularity and totality are coextensive notions 
and for this reason, from a logical point of view, we do not have a circular reasoning: the 
concept of singularity is itself bound to that of a totality and each totality is, in turn, 
expression of a singularity. 
 
 
                                                          
29 See A VI 4, A2, p. 866. 
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5. Infinite versus Infinite: a comparison between different theoretical models 
 
Let us, again, look upon and reconsider Hegel’s criticisms of Leibniz. The first question 
one should ask is if Hegel’s interpretation of Leibniz is not outdone by the latter’s logical-
mathematical hinges on which the definition of singularity is tied. 
At first glance, two options should be considered. On the one hand, Hegel makes, in 
general, a wide use of mathematical tools that, at least indirectly, derive from a Leibnitian's 
(and of course to a Newtonian's) context of analysis. It has often been said that Hegel’s 
theorization of infinity was widely influenced by seventeenth and eighteenth century 
mathematical thought. Therefore, Newton and, even more so, Leibniz were for Hegel rational 
paradigms that are not always explicit in his work. This can be said for the infinitesimal 
calculus, which serves as a concrete example of a ‘qualitative’ process of definition, but also 
for the setup of a logical-categorical system. Actually, in Hegel’s eyes, concepts such as those 
of ‘limit,’ ‘continuum,’ ‘moment,’ ‘integral,’ ‘evanescent quantity’ or ‘differential,’ define the 
logical map that forms the invisible backbone of his philosophical system. 
Hegel might not be far from the truth when he says that the operative presence of 
mathematics of infinity is one of the deepest sources of the logical idea of self-movement. On 
the other hand, what Hegel does not accept of Leibniz is the ontology that supports his 
analysis on infinity and it is on this very ground that he redefines his thought. 
We might therefore say that the paramount aspect here is the different interpretation of 
the concept of infinite given by Leibniz and Hegel. Equally decisive is also the semantic 
voltage that from here reverberate in the two philosopher’s apparatus of concepts. 
As we have seen above, for Leibniz the essential element of his infinitesimal analysis 
consisted in the fact that infinitely small quantities would be considered as ‘evanescent 
quantities.’ And that means that they are not to be intended only as pure ‘zeros,’ but as 
‘relative zeros,’ intending by this a dynamic interpretation of their vanishing point. 
Evanescent quantities tend to dissolve, but in the very instant of their nullification the 
character of the whole retrospective process is preserved.   
For Hegel this kind of paradoxical determination represents the archetype of the very 
notion of ‘concept’ and in his logic (as can be seen clearly from JS II on) he carries out a sort 
of conceptual transliteration of these mathematical categories. ‘Maintaining’ the character of 
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what vanishes is decisive. The infinite is not the result of an intellectual determination, which 
is external to the thing itself, but it is rather the acknowledgement of the inconsistency of the 
concept of ‘determination’ itself as it was posed by the abstract intellect. Hence, the 
difference between ‘reason’ and ‘intellect.’  
Infinite is not bound to ‘things in themselves,’ but to a process of self-experience, which 
enables the faculty of reason to acknowledge itself and to discover itself as the form of 
rationality. Thus, the notion of infinity, in Hegelian terms, can be considered as a kind of self-
determining process, as the emerging of a conceptual ‘character’ that maintains its own 
negativity (the vanishing of intellectual determinations) as an aufgehoben negativity. Infinity 
holds for the ‘infinite acknowledgement’ of its own ‘vanishing’ and, thus, for the infinite 
acknowledgement of its own becoming a ‘concrete’ being. This is the point in which 
epistemology collapses into ontology, becoming ‘real.’ This kind of self-reflecting 
conceptuality always emerges in Hegel’s language from whatever perspective we may look at 
it. 
It is here that Hegel conceptually distances his thought from that of Leibniz. According 
to the latter, the intentional feature of ‘zero’ is meaningful only within an algebraic process. In 
other words, it is significant only within a mathematical context, which poses an abstract 
relation of functionality. Outside this abstract context (remember that for Leibniz 
mathematical entities have just an ideal – and not concrete, or substantial - nature), formal 
intension would not be manageable in any way. Therefore, it would neither refer to anything 
nor would it maintain any particular meaning. 
Unless one considers, as Hegel does, the entire logical-ontological relationship 
subsisting between the Concept itself and its specific determinations as a kind of super-
relationship between an ‘integral’  and its ‘infinitesimals.’ Thus, turning the whole doctrine of 
the Concept into an enormous functional structure that involves the moments that define it.30 
From this point of view, the single categorical contents, as they are exposed in the Logic, 
would play the role of a ‘conceptual algebra.’ And the ‘evanescent’ ‘characters’ of this 
structure should become the pawns of an internal (self-directed) game, in which the meaning 
of each category would be specified by a perpetual process of dissolution, functionally linked 
with a continuous re-emerging (as an aufgehoben) of the whole to which they refer to. To put 
                                                          
30  ‘Moment’ must be intended here as a mathematical term. 
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it in simple terms: the whole Concept would be considered as the process of its own 
dissolution: an evanescent structure that removes itself becoming Nature. 
At the very beginning of this essay, we noticed how in the monadic individual the 
singularity “geht in seiner eigenen Totalität zu Grunde.” We can now ask ourselves, which 
singularity was intended there by Hegel. As we have seen above, the logical-mathematical 
structure that lies at the bottom of the Leibnitian notion of singularity does not seem to be 
undermined here, because, on the contrary, Hegel himself seems to point towards the same 
direction.  
Instead, what is undermined is the ontological (let us say ‘substantial’) level on which 
the definition had been played by Leibniz. Hegel criticizes the infinite number of world-
substances that populated his ontology, because he saw an incompatibility of references. Each 
Leibnitian substance is a conceptual world, thus qualitative, infinite and complete, but 
substances are infinite also in quantity and this multiplication of worlds (each of them 
absolutely self-related to itself and, consequently, ‘closed’ to the others) ended up creating a 
conflict between autonomy and dependence. Each world is completely autonomous, but at the 
same time each world ‘needs’31 the presence of the others. And only a God can be invoked for 
playing the role of an architrave supporting the whole system. 
Naturally, speaking of infinites, there is an intriguing overlapping of levels because 
Hegel, on the one hand, brings forth his own notion of ‘infinity’ as opposed to the ‘bad’ one 
performed by Leibniz; but on the other, his notion of infinite was largely drawn by Leibniz’s 
mathematical settings - and that indeed sounds indeed paradoxical, because for Leibniz the 
infinitesimal calculus was called upon to solve exactly the problem of an arithmetical ‘bad 
infinity.’ 
In this room of mirrors, where the definition of ‘true’ and ‘bad’ infinity seem to switch 
each  others position and to constantly overlap, perhaps lies the key to grasping the meaning 
of an ‘ontology of singularity.’ 
Once again the decisive point involves a semantic stretch in the use of concepts, 
because an apparently similar lexical context implies, conversely, the output of diverging 
theoretical models. An important exemplification of this semantic shifting can be seen, for 
                                                          
31 “Mea certe opinione nihil est in universitate creaturarum, quod ad perfectum suum conceptum non indiget 
alterius cujuscunque rei in rerum universitate conceptu, cum unaquaeque res influat in aliam quamcunque ita ut 
si ipsa sublata aut diversa esse fingeretur, omnia in mundo ab iis quae nunc sunt diversa sint futura.” GP II, p. 
226. 
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instance, in the very notion of ‘contradiction.’ As we have seen, Hegel grants to this category 
the task of interpreting and explicating the concept of ‘evanescent quantity.’ On the other 
hand, Leibniz (as well as other mathematicians of his time) scarcely mentions the term  
‘contradiction’ in his texts.  
This might be surprising at first, if we consider that Leibniz was one of the major 
interpreters of the so-called ‘method of tangents.’ Nonetheless, if we only focus upon the 
mathematical point of view, appealing to ‘contradiction’ to explain the anomalous behaviour 
of such quantities seems unnecessary. Leaving aside the already reported consideration that 
for Leibniz mathematical entities pertain to the ideal sphere of essences,32 the contradiction 
welcomed by Hegel, of quantities that are both null and not-null, can be explained by 
considering the observer’s attitude towards them. The evanescent quantities are equivalent to 
zero when considered in their functional relation to whole numbers, and vice versa they are 
not-null when considered in their functional relation with differential terms. They do not 
change in themselves, but they do change according to the function they are displaying. From 
this point of view the role and the weight of contradiction dims and the whole topic is not any 
longer to be considered in ontological terms. Furthermore, as a backlash, it completely 
changes the theoretical asset from which Hegel poses the issue of singularity. 
Yet, this is – seemingly - Leibniz’s point of view. Or better, this last statement explicitly 
suggests the difficulty of finding a connecting point between the two theoretical systems. 
Regarding the evanescent quantities Hegel, on his side, turns the matter around by putting at 
the core of his thought the contradiction that exists in the very concept of ‘evanescent’ and he 
allows himself to use the speculative results of the mathematics of infinity. 
In conclusion, the problem of the infinite represents one of the major challenges of 
Hegel's thought and it constitutes both a starting as well as a finishing point of his speculative 
philosophical language. However, the focal point of his interpretation of Leibniz (or at least of 
his mathematical categories) is represented by his peculiar and somewhat autonomous 
conception of ‘contradiction.’ It is precisely this latter that intervenes as a semantic medium 
that somehow modifies from within the very concept of mathematical infinite and transforms 
it into a conceptual melting point in which logic and ontology come to be one. In this subtle, 
almost imperceptible way, the whole matter semantically slides and yet it apparently remains 
the same  under the outward appearance of a common lexicon. 
                                                          
32 See PASINI. La Philosophie des mathématiques, p. 956. 
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This is probably the reason that explains why the comparison between Leibniz and 
Hegel, when considering the history of the their philosophical interpretations, is fraught with 
theoretical ambiguity.       
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